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I. INTRODUCTION
Many jurists as well as legal scholars subscribe to a
“political speech theory” of the First Amendment. According to
this theory, speech concerned with politics receives full
constitutional protection while speech that has literary,
commercial, scientific, or other value gets something less than
that.1 However, this Essay contends that the political speech
theory does not actually deserve the broad currency it has. First
Amendment doctrine should not specially privilege political
speech but rather recognize a general speech protection.
In demonstrating that the political speech theory lacks
justification, this Essay first examines the theory as described
by its most prominent proponents.2 Although the Free Speech
Clause, on its face, gives no special protection to political
speech, these proponents usually describe the historical
evidence as nonetheless indicating that such was the Framers’
intent.3 However, this Essay considers the evidence and finds
that it is far from clear that the Framers were trying to create a
special protection for political speech—and, indeed, the
evidence suggests otherwise.4
On the other hand, a few prominent proponents endorse
the political speech theory, even if supporting evidence of intent
is lacking, based on what they see as logical inference.5 In their
view, there must be something special about speech that
explains its unique constitutional protection, and that
something must be the essentiality of unfettered political speech
to self-government, which indicates that the Free Speech Clause
itself is about protecting political speech.6 Or they take the view
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that its constitutional context supports the idea that the First
Amendment serves a public purpose, and thus that the Free
Speech Clause must be about political speech.7 This Essay
points out critical shortcomings in these alternative bases for
the political speech theory.8
The Essay then proposes that the Framers were more
likely motivated to give speech special constitutional protection
because they recognized that speech is different in an important
respect from virtually all other behaviors.9 Speech, unlike most
other behaviors, usually does not impinge upon other persons’
autonomy in any significant way, in the sense that it does not
impede them from taking whatever actions they would prefer to
take. This aspect of speech, which was appreciated by the
Framers, would better explain why they gave speech special
protection, and indeed justifies treating it differently from other
behaviors. Further, as this Essay demonstrates, such an
understanding of the Free Speech Clause is also more workable
in practice than the political speech theory as well as providing
a better vision for our society.10
II. THE POLITICAL SPEECH THEORY
Prominent First Amendment scholars have often taken
the position that the First Amendment is primarily, or even
exclusively, intended to protect political speech. Laurence Tribe
describes “political advocacy” as the “kind of speech that the
First Amendment is meant to protect most vigorously.”11
Alexander Meiklejohn goes further and explains that, in his
view, “[t]he First Amendment does not protect a ‘freedom to
speak.’ It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and
communication by which we ‘govern.’ It is concerned, not with
a private right, but with a public power, a governmental
responsibility.”12 Cass Sunstein reiterates this theme when he
remarks that “political speech . . . belongs at the First
Amendment core.”13 He contends that “the distinction between
political and nonpolitical speech is well-established, and
properly so,” because it “protects speech that serves a central

7

Id.
See infra Sections III–IV.
9
See infra Section V.
10
See infra Section VI.
11
Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. The Controversy, 30 CONST.
COMMENT. 463, 467 (2015).
12
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
255.
13
CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 146 (Free Press,
1st ed. 1993).
8

2019] CORRECTING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
FREE SPEECH CLAUSE

3

function of the [F]irst [A]mendment . . . .”14 Floyd Abrams
agrees that it is “well-established . . . that political speech . . . is
at the core of the First Amendment.”15 Robert Bork even takes
the position that the Constitution protects only explicitly
political speech.16
The Supreme Court’s decisions have at times promoted
and relied upon some version of the political speech theory. For
example, the Court recently stated that political speech is “at
the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect”17
and that “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung on
the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”18 The Court has
emphasized that political speech “is entitled to the most
exacting degree of First Amendment protection,”19 and is the
form of speech to which “the First Amendment ‘has its fullest
and most urgent application.’”20 The Court has also made
decisions in which it has explicitly approved of governmental
regulation of speech that is not in its view political or
sufficiently political.21
Justices have often attributed their endorsement of the
political speech theory to the intention of the Framers. Justice
Black remarked that “[w]hatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment
14

Cass Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 606
(footnote omitted).
15
Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77, 81 (2010).
16
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (“Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that
is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other
form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call
obscene or pornographic.”).
17
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
18
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 145 (1983)).
19
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1984).
20
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 191 (2014) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
21
See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 (finding that a survey about office transfer
policies, developed and administered by an assistant district attorney and distributed
to co-workers, involved speech unprotected by the First Amendment because it was
not “of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an
elected official”). This case is discussed in further detail infra Section VI. More recent
cases emphasizing the special protection given to political speech include McCullen
v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2536 (2014) (“Advocacy of a politically controversial
viewpoint . . . is the essence of First Amendment expression; no form of speech is
entitled to greater constitutional protection.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (finding that the First
Amendment is especially protective of “debate on public issues” and “less rigorous”
where matters of public concern are not involved); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 329 (2010) (“Political speech . . . is central to the meaning and purpose of the
First Amendment.”).
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was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”22 He
further remarked: “There is nothing in the language of the First
Amendment to indicate that it protects only political speech,
although to provide such protection was no doubt a strong
reason for the Amendment’s passage.”23 Justice Thomas
similarly concludes that “[p]olitical speech is the primary object
of First Amendment protection, . . . a proposition that ought to
be unassailable,” and among the sources he cites for this
conclusion is James Madison,24 who proposed the amendment
to the First Congress and authored its initial version.25 There is,
of course, a substantial difference between Thomas’s position
that political speech is “the primary object” of the First
Amendment and Black’s hedgier one that it is “a major
purpose.”26 But these Justices share the sense that the First
Amendment is particularly concerned with political speech and
that such an interpretation vindicates the Framers’ intention.
Many legal scholars have likewise attributed such a
perspective to the Framers. Sunstein concludes that
[t]he best view of the relevant
history is that political speech was
thought to form the core of the free
speech principle. This does not
mean that all other speech was
entirely excluded; but it does mean
that the framers’ principal fear was
government censorship of political
22

Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
HUGO BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 46 (1969) (emphasis omitted).
24
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410–11 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing James Madison, Report on the Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 347, 397 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)). The source identified by
Thomas as justifying his conclusion consists of a letter written by Madison in
response to the Sedition Act. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan.
18, 1800), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON at 397. The part to which Thomas
refers is presumably where Madison’s letter says that “the right of electing the
members of the Government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and
responsible government. The value and efficacy of this right depends on the
knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust,
and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these merits
and demerits of the candidates respectively.” Id. Madison is certainly saying here
that freedom to discuss candidates for office is essential to self-government. Given
that he was responding specifically to the Sedition Act, which forbade certain kinds
of statements against the government, it is not surprising that his letter would not
discuss other uses of the First Amendment. However, Madison does not, in any
event, say or imply here that “the primary object” of the First Amendment—in the
words of Thomas—is protecting political speech.
25
See 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 20 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.
1987). Madison has been recognized as “the leader in the preparation of the First
Amendment.” Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941).
26
Shrink, 528 U.S. at 410–11; BLACK, supra note 23.
23
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speech. There can be little doubt
that
suppression
by
the
government of political ideas of
which it disapproved, or which it
found threatening, was the central
motivation for the clause.27
Similarly, other scholars have concurred that “[f]ree political
speech . . . is the very core of what James Madison drafted and
the Framers adopted when they guaranteed the people that
‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.’”28 Accordingly, it has been argued that the sense of “a
hierarchy in which political speech receives more protection
than commercial or artistic speech . . . is consistent with the
Founders’ goals in drafting the First Amendment, as Madison’s
emphasis was on guaranteeing citizens the right to criticize and
question the government.”29
This sense that the Free Speech Clause is focused on
political speech has led to varying theories of application. Some
scholars have defined political speech narrowly to mean that
which is directly related to government decision-making,30
while others have defined it more broadly as any speech that
contributes to public discourse.31 For those who view it
narrowly, constitutional protection is limited to speech that
facilitates self-government.32 For those who view it more
broadly, constitutional protection differs in degree between
27

SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 132. The footnote supporting Sunstein’s claim about
the “best view of the relevant history” states that that view is derived from Leonard
Levy’s Emergence of a Free Press and “also from a reading of the materials collected in”
the Founders’ Constitution. Id. at 273 n.11; LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PRESS (1985); 5 FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 25. Some sources from The
Founders’ Constitution are discussed infra, Section III.
28
James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Needs No Reform:
Protecting Liberty from Campaign Finance “Reformers”, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 837
(2002) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I).
29
Susan Hanley Kosse & Robert H. Wright, How Best To Confront the Bully: Should
Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes Be the Answer?, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 53, 78
(2005) (emphasis omitted).
30
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 16, at 27 (“The category of protected speech should
consist of speech concerned with governmental behavior, policy, or personnel . . . .”).
31
See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97
VA. L. REV. 617 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value
of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011). See also SUNSTEIN, supra
note 13, at 130 (describing speech as political “when it is both intended and received
as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue”). Sunstein describes it as
“a broad standard” that includes “all speech that bears on potentially public issues as
falling within the free speech core. It is unnecessary to show that the relevant speech
specifically calls for some change in the law, or tells government to do something.
Public deliberation can deal with social norms as well as legal requirements.” Id. at
130–31.
32
See, e.g., Bork, supra note 16; Meiklejohn, supra note 12.
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political and nonpolitical speech.33 In either situation, the scope
of the speech covered by the Clause is narrower than it would
be if the Clause was seen as protecting speech in general. For
example, in Sunstein’s view, political speech cannot usually be
regulated, while nonpolitical speech can be regulated whenever
the government can show a “strong” and “legitimate” reason
for doing so.34
A significant trend in First Amendment jurisprudence
and legal theory is that the Framers intended the Free Speech
Clause to give special protection to political speech and to give
less or even no protection to nonpolitical speech. If that is not
actually an accurate understanding of the Framers’ intent, then
the First Amendment decisions that depend upon such an
understanding may be inadequately justified.
III. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
Despite confident assertions from both jurists and
scholars, the idea that Madison and the Framers intended the
Free Speech Clause to be particularly concerned with political
speech is subject to serious doubt. It is not even clear what has
led to such confidence among the proponents of the political
speech theory, since support for their assertions is often left
nonspecific.35
Indeed, the historical evidence for the political speech
theory is, at best, equivocal. In presenting the Bill of Rights to
the First Congress, Madison gave no specific explanation of the
meaning of the Free Speech Clause.36 He described the
amendments more generally as involving rights both designed
to promote the formation of government and to protect persons
against government.37 That does not rule out the possibility that
the Free Speech Clause, like many of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights, was intended to preserve a fundamentally private
right (and thus was not oriented toward political speech).
Further, Madison’s initial wording of the provision was
not designed to specially protect political speech. It stated: “The
33

See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, infra note 59 and accompanying text.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 123. According to Sunstein, nonpolitical speech can be
regulated when the government makes “a persuasive demonstration that a strong and
legitimate government interest is promoted by the regulation at issue.” Id.
35
See SUNSTEIN, supra notes 13, 27; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 410–11 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
37
Id. at 454 (“In some instances they assert those rights which are exercised by the
people in forming and establishing a plan of Government. In other instances, they
specify those rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be
exercised by the Legislature. In other instances, they specify positive rights, which
may seem to result from the nature of the compact.”).
34

2019] CORRECTING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
FREE SPEECH CLAUSE

7

people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak,
to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the
press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be
inviolable.”38 Nothing in this language indicates that the Free
Speech Clause was meant to privilege political speech, just as
the final version of the First Amendment gives no hint of such
an intention.39
Although the Framers could nonetheless have assumed
a special protection for political speech, some of those involved
took great pains to emphasize the broad scope of what they had
in mind. For example, a pseudonymous letter published in a
Boston paper the year before Madison presented his version of
the First Amendment to Congress opined that Americans felt
themselves entitled to “speak, write and publish their
sentiments with decency and independency on every subject . . .
.”40 Thomas Jefferson’s preferred language for the First
Amendment was similarly broad, calling for the freedom to
speak, write, or publish “any thing but false facts affecting
injuriously the life, property, or reputation of others or affecting
the peace of the confederacy with foreign nations.”41 The
Kentucky Constitution of 1799 legislated in the same vein:
“The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of
the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely
speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty.”42 These conceptions of free speech
account for long-standing exceptions such as libel, but they are
capacious rather than evincing a particular concern for speech
about politics. Such examples do not prove that the
Constitution’s version of free speech was intended to be
similarly broad. But they do indicate that the context in which
the Framers operated was hardly one in which we can see any
shared sense that free speech meant political speech. Thus, it is
harder to understand the language of Madison’s version of the
First Amendment, and of the version ultimately adopted, as
imbued with such an implicit concern.
Further, sources with which the Framers were likely
familiar conceived of free speech more broadly. John Milton’s
Areopagitica, published in 1644, defends the freedom not simply
38

Id. at 451.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40
Philalethes, HERALD OF FREEDOM (Bos.), Sept. 15, 1788, quoted in JEFFREY A.
SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN
JOURNALISM 19 (1988) (emphasis added).
41
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 5 FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 130 (emphasis added).
42
Art. 10, Sec. 7, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 141
(emphasis added).
39
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of the people to challenge their governors, including religious
authorities, but also the freedom of playwrights and poets (such
as Homer and Aristophanes) to create their works without prior
restraint, and scientists like Galileo to present their views
without censorship.43 Milton described free speech as beneficial
to art and erudition generally, referring to it as “the nurse of all
great wits,” and attributed to it an enlargement of the human
capacity.44 Cato’s Letter No. 15 of 1720, which is known to
have influenced the Framers,45 also made a case for such
general protection.46 It is true that Cato describes freedom of
speech as important to “publick liberty” and “essential to free
government.”47 Moreover, he gives a number of examples of
how the ability to criticize leaders had benefitted the governed
throughout history, and remarks that freedom of speech “is the
terror of traitors and oppressors.”48 However, Cato also points
out that having such freedom “produces excellent writers, and
encourages men of fine genius,” such that when it was denied
“those great wits were no more.”49 These sources describe
freedom of speech as desirable because it produces an
environment generally fit for artistic and intellectual endeavors
and do not describe it as having a “central” or “core” political
value.
Madison did refer to freedom of the press in his original
version of the First Amendment as “one of the great bulwarks
of liberty,”50 which may suggest that he at least saw that
adjacent right as particularly important to self-government.
Madison’s fellow Virginian, George Mason, had described
freedom of the press with the same wording in his Virginia
Declaration of Rights.51 Both may have gotten this language
from Cato’s letter, which had called freedom of speech “the
great bulwark of liberty.”52 And both may have also been
influenced by William Blackstone, who had written that “[t]he
liberty of the [press] is indeed [essential] to the nature of a free
43

JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER WRITINGS 98–142 (William Poole ed.,
Penguin Books 2014) (1644).
44
Id. at 135.
45
LEVY, supra note 27, at 113–14; see also CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE
REPUBLIC 141 (1953).
46
JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, Cato’s Letter No. 15: Of Freedom of Speech:
That the Same is Inseparable from Publick Liberty (Feb. 15, 1721), in CATO’S LETTERS
1720–23, https://www.constitution.org/cl/cato_015.htm.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See ANNALS, supra note 36, at 451.
51
The Virginia Declaration of Rights § 12 (Va. 1776) (“That the freedom of the press is
one of the great bulwarks of liberty and can never be restrained but by despotic
governments.”), http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm.
52
TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 46.
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[state] . . . .”53 So when Madison included freedom of the press
in his version of the First Amendment, and singled it out as a
“great bulwark[ ] of liberty,” that aspect of the wording could
be seen as providing some support for the political speech
theory.
Still, even freedom of the press was understood as
having a broad rather than narrow meaning. Blackstone
concluded that “[t]o subject the press to the restrictive power of
a licenser . . . is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and
infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion,
and government.”54 Blackstone’s invocation of freedom of the
press as a resource for “all controverted points in learning,
religion, and government”55 evidently encompassed much more
than matters of politics. Further, a letter from the Continental
Congress to the Province of Quebec in 1774 extolled the
freedom of the press not only for its value to self-government
but also its contribution to “the advancement of truth, science,
morality, and arts in general.”56 John Marshall described it as
“signif[ying] a liberty to publish, free from previous restraint,
any thing and every thing at the discretion of the printer only . .
. .”57 Thus, the “press” referred to in the First Amendment does
not appear to have been a metonym intended to mean
newspapers, as we are more likely to use it now, but rather
appears to encompass all the materials produced by printing
presses. Indeed, Madison’s 1800 Report on the Virginia
Resolutions treated “the press” as synonymous with “printed
publications.”58 Given that even the Free Press Clause seems to
embody a broad protection for all manner of publications, the
Free Speech Clause that accompanies it is unlikely to have been
dedicated to political speech.
The conclusion of political speech theory proponents
that the Free Speech Clause is primarily intended to protect
53

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151.
Id. at *152.
55
Id.
56
Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774),
in 1 FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 442.
57
John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799),
in 5 FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 25, at 136, 138.
58
Id. at 142 (“The freedom of the press under the common law is, in the defences of
the Sedition Act, made to consist in an exemption from all previous restraint on
printed publications by persons authorized to inspect and prohibit them. It appears to
the committee that this idea of the freedom of the press can never be admitted to be
the American idea of it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications would
have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them. It would
seem a mockery to say that no laws should be passed preventing publications from
being made, but that laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should be
made.”).
54
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political speech is not justified by either the original version of
the Amendment, the conceptions that likely influenced it, or its
final language. At least some of its sources support the idea that
the clause was meant to describe speech more generally. Thus,
there is considerable historical evidence that calls the political
speech theory into question, despite proponents’ description of
it as a matter of “little doubt” or even “unassailable.”59
IV. THE “LOGIC” OF THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
Although it is not as clear as many claim,60 that
protection of political speech is the intended purpose of the
Free Speech Clause, the political speech theory does at least
provide a possible explanation for why speech is treated
differently under the Constitution than other behaviors. There
must indeed be something about speech that led the Framers to
give it special protection from regulation. That something, in
the view of some political speech theorists, is that selfgovernment cannot happen unless persons are free to engage in
political speech.
This aspect has led some proponents of the political
speech theory to endorse it, even where they view the historical
evidence of intent as insufficient. For example, Bork considers
the idea that the Free Speech Clause protects only political
speech to be dictated by logic rather than by evidence of
legislative intent.61 As he suggests, if there were no Free Speech
Clause, freedom for political speech would still have to be
inferred in order for self-government to function.62 He reasons
that this is the only plausible explanation for the special
distinction given to speech in the Constitution.63 And a
corollary of this thinking is that speech that is not necessary to
self-government is not constitutionally protected because it is
not distinctive in this way from other behaviors that can be
59

See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410–11 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 132.
60
See supra Section II.
61
Bork, supra note 16, at 22 (taking the position that “[t]he first amendment, like the
rest of the Bill of Rights, appears to have been a hastily drafted document upon
which little thought was expended”).
62
Id. at 23 (“The first amendment indicates that there is something special about
speech. We would know that much even without a first amendment, for the entire
structure of the Constitution creates a representative democracy, a form of
government that would be meaningless without freedom to discuss government and
its policies. Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred even if there
were no first amendment.”).
63
Id. at 26 (“This function of speech, its ability to deal explicitly, specifically and
directly with politics and government, is different from any other form of human
activity. But the difference exists only with respect to one kind of speech: explicitly
and predominantly political speech.”).
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regulated.64 Although logic does indicate that political speech
must be included in the category of constitutionally-protected
free speech due to its essential role in self-government, it does
not follow that the Free Speech Clause therefore only protects,
or is only meant to protect, political speech.
Indeed, the words chosen by legislators presumably tell
us whether a law is intended to be specific to a particular
concern or more generic. The unrestrictive language of the First
Amendment suggests that it is more generally concerned.65 It
may be revealing to compare the First Amendment to the
Fourteenth, about which we have more legislative history.
Given the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, it can
reasonably be inferred that it was intended to prevent
discrimination against black Americans, who at the time of its
adoption had been recently emancipated from slavery.66
However, the drafters of that amendment, and the other
Reconstruction amendments, chose more general language, and
it makes sense to think they did so to address not only the
specific example of racial discrimination before them but other
instances of discrimination that might be recognized as
analogous. (Indeed, the legislative history of that amendment
indicates that that is so).67 Thus, black Americans are certainly
protected from discrimination by the Fourteenth Amendment,
given that we know that its drafters were concerned about
slavery and its aftermath.68 However, the amendment must
protect others as well, since the language chosen by the
legislators is broader than necessary to accomplish only that
particular purpose. Similarly, the Framers likely chose their
wording for the First Amendment advisedly and intended the
broader meaning that goes with the broader wording. They
64

Id. at 28 (“[T]he rationale of the first amendment cannot be the protection of all
things or activities that influence political attitudes. Any speech may do that, and we
have seen that it is impossible to leave all speech unregulated. Moreover, any
conduct may affect political attitudes as much as a novel, and we cannot view the
first amendment as a broad denial of the power of government to regulate
conduct.”).
65
See, e.g., United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800–01 (1966) (stating that “plain
and unlimited” language of law should be enforced and given “a sweep as broad as
its language”).
66
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964) (“[T]he central purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating
from official sources in the States.”).
67
See Speech of Hon. J. A. Bingham, in CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1871),
at 83–86 (acknowledging the importance of the amendment to the freed slaves, but
also mentioning that it would apply to Native Americans as well, and concluding
that it would also benefit poor people settling the frontiers).
68
See, e.g., David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
333, 337 (2003) (“The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted to
deal with the aftermath of slavery and the racial discrimination that prevailed after
the Civil War.”).
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presumably would have chosen narrower wording had they
intended a narrower meaning.
In addition, there is no reason to believe that the
Framers were particularly unimaginative, or so much the
creatures of a moment, that they did not foresee other uses for
free speech than to constitute government. Indeed, the political
speech theorists must not only imagine that the Framers did
not, but also that they understood there to be distinct categories
of “political” and “nonpolitical” that speech can be sorted into.
That is not something evidenced by the sources that influenced
the Framers or the announced views of the Framers themselves.
In fact, defining what does and does not constitute political
speech is not something even political speech theorists have
been able to agree upon.69 Even if the Framers highly valued
what we may conceive of as political speech, it might still be
wrong to believe that they saw any meaningful distinction
between political and nonpolitical speech or regarded such a
distinction as a salubrious one to make.
For some proponents, contextual cues justify the
conclusion that the Free Speech Clause is specifically about
protecting political speech. Meiklejohn remarks that “the First
Amendment, as seen in its constitutional setting, forbids
Congress to abridge the freedom of a citizen’s speech, press,
peaceable assembly, or petition, whenever those activities are
utilized for the governing of the nation.”70 Such an interpretation
implies that it is logically discernable from context that the Free
Speech Clause vindicates the public concern of self-government
rather than a private right.71 However, it is difficult to see how
the “setting” of the Clause leads to such an interpretation. The
First Amendment begins by referencing the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses; then, after a semicolon, sets forth rights
of speech and press; then, after another semicolon, concludes
with peaceable assembly and petition of the government.72 This
formulation includes at least one indubitably private right—free
exercise—that shows that the First Amendment cannot be
described as preoccupied with the tools of self-government.73
Further, as a matter of syntax, the amendment’s semicolons
merely serve to pair the rights of free speech and press with
69
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each other,74 rather than to orient them toward the ultimate,
unannounced objective that Meiklejohn proposes.
Moreover, the idea that the First Amendment must be
focused on self-government is undermined by the Framers’
avowed concern for people’s private interests.75 It is interesting
in this regard to compare the Free Speech Clause with the Free
Exercise Clause, which likely no one would argue was intended
to protect religious exercise only to the extent that such exercise
serves a public purpose. Free exercise is part of the Constitution
because it is both a right people wanted protected for its own
sake and one that is not inimical to the constitution of
government.76 It is side by side with an Establishment Clause
that performs the valuable service to government of reducing
sectarian conflict77—although even that clause can also be seen
as having the private benefit of keeping government out of the
religious sphere.78 As with the Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses, the private and public implications of the religion
clauses are seemingly intermingled and complex rather than
evincing any single logically-deducible “primary” purpose. Like
most pieces of legislation, they represent a compromise
between private interests and public needs, reflecting both, and,
like most negotiated bargains, not solely defined by either.79
The Free Speech Clause, likewise, does not seem something
that can be logically reduced to whatever public benefits it may
have, given that the ability to speak without governmental
intervention has considerable private importance.
Even if it is true that political speech must be protected
for self-government to function, it does not follow that only
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political speech is protected, nor that what entitles speech to
special protection must be its value to self-government. Further,
there are reasons to suspect that something else accounts for the
Framers’ conclusion that speech is entitled to special
protection, given their choice of broad rather than specific
language, and the lack of evidence that they even distinguished
between political and nonpolitical speech. There is, in addition,
nothing about the context of the Free Speech Clause that
indicates that the Framers saw it as specially focused on the
goal of facilitating self-government.
V. GENERAL SPEECH PROTECTION: AN ALTERNATIVE
THEORY OF WHAT THE FRAMERS MEANT BY FREE SPEECH
Although the Framers must indeed have seen something
distinctive about speech that led them to provide it with a
special constitutional exemption from regulation, the most
plausible candidate for that something is not the essentiality of
free speech to self-government, but the important natural
difference that exists between speech and most other behaviors.
Speech is different from most other behaviors in that it
generally does not impinge upon other persons’ autonomy in
any significant way insofar as it does not prevent its hearers
from taking whatever actions they would prefer to take. The
general protection provided for speech in the First Amendment
may thus be seen as reflecting a recognition of the naturally
non-impinging quality that most speech has.
Speech can be seen as an extension of another behavior
that has an exceptional non-impinging quality, and that is the
act of thinking. Indeed, speech and thought are closely
intertwined. Speech is the means by which we convey our
thoughts to others and make them manifest—one can literally
speak one’s thoughts aloud—and it is the means by which we
receive thoughts from others. Regulation of speech would be
akin to regulation of thought, and speech may be specially
exempt from regulation for much the same reason that thought
is exempt (or would be, if government had the power to
regulate thought).
Recognition of the close relationship between speech
and thought was apparent in the early influences on the
Framers. Blackstone considered thought to be beyond
regulation, concluding that there could not be “any restraint . . .
laid upon freedom of thought or [in]quiry” or the “liberty of
private sentiment.”80 He contrasted the power that government
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had under common law to punish wrong exercises of freedom
of the press, such as libel, with the saving grace that such a
power could not reach these thought- and sentiment-based
freedoms.81
Milton also drew a connection in his Areopagitica
between thinking and speaking: “Give me the liberty to know,
to utter and to argue freely according to conscience, above all
liberties.”82 In this formulation, to “know” and to “utter” are
kindred and adjacent faculties, similarly exceptional when it
comes to government regulation.
Likewise, Cato began his influential letter endorsing free
speech by remarking, “[w]ithout freedom of thought, there can
be no such thing as wisdom; and no such thing as publick
liberty, without freedom of speech . . . .”83 Although thereby
making an explicit connection between freedom of speech and
general liberty, Cato’s description also draws a parallel between
freedom of thought and freedom of speech.84 Freedom of
thought is a given in this conceptualization, and freedom of
speech its analogue.85
Madison himself was no stranger to such a concern for
freedom of thought. Although making the point in the specific
context of freedom of religion, he once remarked that he
flattered himself that he had “in this country extinguished
forever the ambitious hope of making laws for the human
mind.”86 If regulation of thought is not a legitimate government
activity, and if speech is akin to thought, then it makes sense to
think of it as similarly exempt from regulation.
The Supreme Court has itself at times noted the
connection between speech and thought. For example,
Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney v. California remarked that
the Framers believed in the “freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think.”87 The Court has also in other cases
described the First Amendment as protecting “individual
freedom of mind”88 and “the right of freedom of thought.”89
Restricting a person’s speech, to the extent that the
speech conveys thought, is similar in its intrusiveness to
restricting a person’s thought itself; it strikes close to the heart
81
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of what it means to be a human being.90 Of course, as a
practical matter, government is largely impeded from regulating
people’s thoughts,91 but if such regulation were practical—and
it one day may be—it would likely be criticized as an
unjustified intrusion, and not merely to the extent that it
involved regulation of political thoughts.
However, it is not just the importance of speech to
persons as a conveyance of thought that makes speech special
and worthy of particular protection. Indeed, there are many
cherished behaviors that government can regulate quite
intrusively without running afoul of the Constitution. For
example, physical liberty is vitally important to persons as well,
but there are many situations in which they are required by the
government to sacrifice it—as in arrest and detention under
reasonable suspicion, imprisonment after conviction of a crime,
and conscription into military service, (not to mention jury
duty). Physical liberty is not treated by the Constitution as
subject to special protection even though it is undoubtedly of
great value to human beings.92
What makes speech special is rather the quality it shares
with thought: it is usually the case that speech, like all thought,
does not interfere with the liberty of others. Most of the time,
speech that conveys the thoughts of another merely renders
something conceived in a person’s mind into a form that
another person’s mind can consider, and involves no more
intrusion upon another’s liberty than is involved in triggering
the other’s perception of the speech. And it is relatively easy for
any person to escape this slight imposition placed on her by the
speech of another: she can simply decide to stop listening to it.93
Most other behaviors, by contrast, cannot be deprived of impact
so easily: to live somewhere limits another’s choices of where to
live; to take a job deprives another person of an employment
90
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opportunity; to consume resources reduces the resources
available to others. Accordingly, it is necessary to regulate most
behaviors in order to make collective society possible, but not
so speech that simply conveys thought.
It is this non-impinging tendency that makes speech
special and distinct from other behaviors in much the same way
that thought is, and that likely influenced the Framers to endow
it with a general protection from government regulation. If so,
the only speech that should be regulated is the kind that does
not have this non-impinging quality, that is, speech that directly
interferes with the liberty of others. This view was originally
promoted by Cato, who described free speech as “the right of
every man, as far as by it he does not hurt and control the right
of another; and this is the only check which it ought to suffer,
the only bounds which it ought to know.”94
Certainly, some speech does operate as a restraint upon
others’ liberty and therefore is not entitled to exemption from
regulation. As Justice Holmes famously explained in Schenck v.
United States: “The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of
force.”95 Holmes’s remark hints at what makes such speech
subject to regulation. It is speech that goes beyond merely
persuading or urging others to act. Indeed, few people consider
persuasive or even “pushy” speech constraining because it is
well within the power of a competent adult to resist its
encouragements. But shouting “fire!” in a crowded theater in
effect “hijacks” the will of another, and thus does not resemble
simple thought-conveying speech with its minimal effect on
liberty. It is speech that is intended to, and does, deprive
persons of their ability to choose the actions they otherwise
would have chosen to engage in. It is therefore not the kind of
speech the Free Speech Clause specially protects.
Speech that facilitates the commission of a crime
likewise interferes with individuals’ liberty. It is this impact that
the Supreme Court was referring to in Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co.,96 where it observed that “it has never been deemed an
abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed.”97 In crimes such as the solicitation
94
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of murder or extortion of money, or with the threat of violence
that accompanies a robbery, the speaker is using speech as a
means of bringing about an end that is itself criminal. In such
instances, speech functions something like a weapon to reduce
the freedom of another. Accordingly, such speech can be
regulated because it does not have the non-impinging quality of
the speech the First Amendment protects.
What made speech special to the Framers could very
well have been its similarity to thought and the extent to which
it often shares, with thought, a characteristic non-impinging
quality. Certainly, this aspect of speech was—and is—well
appreciated. And it is more plausible as a basis for the Clause’s
special protection of free speech than that proposed by the
political speech theory, especially given the broad nature of the
protection implied in the general language of the Clause itself.
VI. THE WORKABILITY OF THE RESULTING LEGAL STANDARD
The idea that the First Amendment protects all speech,
except speech that interferes with the liberty of others, implies a
fairly straightforward analysis for contested speech. The focus
of such an analysis should be on whether the speech at issue
interferes with the ability of persons to do what they would
choose to do, and therefore should be susceptible to regulation.
Such would be the case with speech that misleads persons into
doing what they would otherwise prefer not to do (as would
falsely yelling “fire!” in a crowded theater) or that forces them
to act contrary to their actual desires (as extortionate speech
does).
Such an approach contrasts with the complicated
evaluation needed to political speech theory. In practice,
political speech has proven difficult to identify, even when
defined in the narrow sense of being about speech that directly
facilitates self-government.98 For example, in Connick v. Myers,99
the Supreme Court parsed a survey, administered by an
assistant district attorney to her colleagues about the
functioning of that office, to determine whether it qualified as
political speech.100 The five Justices in the majority rejected the
idea that the questions in the survey were sufficiently political
to be protected, while the four Justices in dissent reached the
opposite conclusion.101 Whether speech has political impact or
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significance is evidently difficult to ascertain.102 Furthermore,
political speech theorists do not even agree on whether political
speech should be defined as narrowly as the Court did in
Connick.103 Proponents often define speech in the broader sense
of speech that contributes to public discourse and social
norms.104 However, such a definition gives even less guidance
to a court as to what is and is not constitutionally-protected
speech.
For example, Sunstein proposes that nonpolitical speech
may not be regulated unless there is “a persuasive
demonstration that a strong and legitimate government interest
is promoted by the regulation at issue.”105 However, what
constitutes the showing of a “strong” and “legitimate”
government interest is seemingly subjective. Advertising for
unhealthful products, pornography that demeans women, video
games that exalt violence, electrical wiring instructions for
amateurs, and music and fiction valorizing recreational use of
narcotics are a few among many examples of expression that
government could be said to show a “strong” and “legitimate”
interest in regulating, in the interest of people’s health and
safety. It would be a guess as to what paternalistic regulations
of speech would and would not be permitted under such a
standard.
On the other hand, these examples are readily
recognizable as instances of speech that do not impinge upon
the liberty of others—they do not prevent other persons from
being able to choose to do what they would prefer to do. Of
course, hard cases could still arise—say, whether graphically
violent video games cause minors to become violent and
therefore amount to a constraint on others’ liberty—but such
questions can be examined through an empirical lens to see if
there is actual evidence of such an impact. But whether speech
qualifies as “political”—or whether government can show a
“strong” and “legitimate” interest in regulating it—is neither
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capable of precise determination nor susceptible to empirical
resolution.
Simply because the political speech theory does not
provide for a very workable constitutional standard does not by
itself disprove the notion that the Framers intended the Free
Speech Clause to focus on political speech, but it is another
factor that undermines the persuasiveness of that theory. Not
only does the Free Speech Clause itself lack any indication that
it is supposed to be focused on “political speech,”106 but there is
no reason to believe that the Framers would have necessarily
seen such a concept as giving rise to a reasonably applicable
standard.
A Free Speech Clause that protected speech unless that
speech could be shown to interfere with the liberty of others
would not only better adhere to the letter (and probable spirit)
of the law, but would also be a more intelligible, more
applicable standard.
VII. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment should be understood as
protecting all speech and not as particularly addressing political
speech. That prominent jurists and scholars have asserted that
the Free Speech Clause is focused on protecting political speech
has had a substantial impact on our understanding of the Free
Speech Clause and has served to narrow its application in law.
It is a theory that has largely rested on the premise that the
Framers intended such a conception of the Clause. However,
the historical evidence indicates that the Framers and those
who influenced them were more ecumenical in their views,
recognizing the importance of protecting nonpolitical as well as
political speech, and perhaps not even making a conceptual
distinction between these sorts of speech.
Some proponents have asserted nonetheless that the
“logic” of constitutional construction leads to the conclusion
that protection of political speech is the main or even sole
object of the Free Speech Clause. But such logic requires a leap
in the opposite direction of the general language of the Clause
and the Framers’ stated concern for the protection of private
rights.
This Essay’s alternative theory of what the Framers
meant by free speech—that it was regarded as concomitant with
thought and, in most instances, similarly non-impinging—is
more consistent with the historical evidence, and proceeds from
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more compelling logic. Further, this alternative theory of what
speech is entitled to protection produces a more workable Free
Speech Clause than does the political speech theory. In
determining when regulation of speech is permitted,
constitutional jurisprudence should not try to distinguish
between political and nonpolitical speech but between speech
that interferes with the liberty of others and speech that does
not. Such an approach would more plausibly frame the issue,
provide for more predictable application, and could promote
the development of a more intelligible free speech doctrine.
Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence that
differentiates between political speech and other kinds of speech
should be reconsidered, and the Free Speech Clause instead
understood as creating a broad and general protection.
This conception of the Free Speech Clause also offers a
better vision for our society. Under the political speech theory,
it is quite possible to imagine a polity that allows the free
exchange of political opinions, but that clamps down on
whatever expressions in art, commerce, and science the
majority of citizens happen to find objectionable. Such a
conception fully achieves the aims of the Free Speech Clause as
described by Meiklejohn as well as other political speech
theorists, insofar as it fully protects those activities of thought
and communication by which we govern.107 But there is good
reason to believe the Framers actually had in mind such a
general speech protection because it creates a better
environment for human flourishing.
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